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This paper examines the effect of collusion by a special interest 
group (Association of the Resident Housewives, ARH) in the apart- 
ment market between 2006 and 2007 in Korea. Using the Difference- 
In-Difference (DID) design and carefully matching the apartments, it 
is estimated that every instance of collusion results in an increase 
of from KRW 7.2 to 40.3 million in the apartment price. The amount 
of increase varies by districts and apartment unit characteristics. 
The result in this paper shows that the effects of collusion explain 
the cause of a rapid rise in the price of apartment between 2006 
and 2007. This paper contributes to the collusion literature by 
closely examining how a special interest group (ARH) affects price 
through the collusion.
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Difference in Difference (DID), Bidding ring
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I. Introduction
In Korea, residential apartments are considered as an effective solution 
for providing housing in major metropolitan areas. Apartments do not 
only provide housing but further serve as symbol of wealth and social 
status as they are highly valuable assets, constituting the largest por- 
tion of a typical household’s wealth. Therefore, the price volatility of the 
apartments is a very serious concern for apartment residents.
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There were three periods of large increases on apartment prices for 
the periods of 1990 to 1991, 2001 to 2002, and 2006 to 2007 in Korea.1 
These price increases are striking compared to other periods. Regarding 
drastic price increases of apartments, there has been a fierce debate 
about the real estate bubble including apartments in Korea since early 
2000 (Lee and Kim 2006; Kim 2006; Park 2009). In this continuing de- 
bate, researchers have mainly focused on the large shifts in apartment 
prices but have paid less attention to the causes of the large price shifts.
The most commonly accepted reason for the price increases is the 
lack of apartment supply, especially in the period from 2006 to 2007.2 
Such phenomenon seems trivial using the Demand-Supply curve frame- 
work. However, the sudden and dramatic increase in price does not seem 
to be fully captured by a supply shortage alone. Collusion in the apart- 
ment market has been mentioned as another culprit of sudden price 
increases since 2000 but only got the full attention in 2006. Hence, 
this paper investigates another potential source of the housing price 
increase: collusion. Specifically, the paper examines the effect of collusion 
in the apartment market and further estimates the effect of collusion on 
the price increase.
Collusion in the apartment market by the Association of the Resident 
Housewives (ARH)3 has been suspected as an important source for the 
price increases since 1980s in Gangnam district4 in Seoul.5 Articles 
1 Refer to Appendix Figure 1.
2 “Ways to stabilize the real estate market,” a report by the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation (MOCT) in November 15
th
, 2006, shows that 
the number of supply of residential buildings was the lowest for all types of 
building; it decreased from 29.7 million in 2003 to 18.2 million in 2006.
3 ARH is a cohesive neighborhood association comprised of women who re- 
present each apartment in Korea. It is not a legal or corporate entity, it has 
been delegated of certain rights from the Committee of the Repesentative 
Residents (CRR) of each apartment complex, which is the only official entity 
based on the law on the management of residential apartments (for more infor- 
mation, refer to III.A).
4 It is necessary to differentiate Gangnam and Gangnam district in this paper. 
Koreans use the Han river as the border to divide Seoul into two areas, 
Gangnam (south of the Han River) and Gangbuk (north of the Han River). 
Gangnam indicates all districts below the Han river in Seoul and Gangbuk also 
indicates all districts above the Han river. “Gangnam district” (Gangbuk district) 
is just one district in Gangnam (Gangbuk). For more information, please refer to 
the administration system in Korea, Appendix 1.
5 “Investigation of collusion for the Bubble Seven Regions, Gangnam etc.”, 
Financial News, July 30, 2006. 
“Revelation of 58 complexes having a price collusion", Kook-min il bo, July 
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about collusion led by ARH are not difficult to find in the internet.6 It 
is notable that there is a larger number of articles from 2006 to 2007 
than from 2000 to 2005.7 The price increases from 2006 to 2007 is 
also special for two reasons. First, the Korean government started pro- 
secuting collusion in apartments for the first time. Second, the price 
fluctuated more in Seoul and Gyeonggi province compared to other 
regions, which is different from 1990 to 1991 and from 2001 to 2002 
price increase periods. Survey results on apartment price collusion also 
indicate that the rise in prices is closely related to collusion.8 Along 
with the evidence of statistics on the number of articles and survey 
results, government investigation further indicates that the period from 
2006 to 2007 offers the best setting to examine the real effect of collusion 
by ARH. If the result shows that there is an effect, we can conclude 
that collusion is another culprit besides lack of supply, which explains 
the steep price increase in apartments in Seoul from 2006 to 2007.
Although this paper does not explicitly introduce a model, from a 
theoretical view, apartment market collusion can be viewed in the per- 
spective of “bidding rings,” especially with dynamic auctions. This concept 
is applicable in explaining the apartment market collusion despite its 
auction setting. In this setting, bidders are able to not only observe the 
current bid price but also bid multiple times until the highest price wins 
the bid. These rules make the dynamic auction vulnerable to collusion 
since they do not bid against other cartel members. Also, since there 
are no incentives to cheat on their values, they bid their true values. 
Hence, it minimizes the problem of information misrepresentation by its 
members (Kovacic 2006). This collusion setting also can be interpreted 
with a repeated bilateral bargaining using auction in a bidding ring 
21, 2006.
6 Appendix Figure 2 shows the number of articles related to apartment price 
collusion.
7 There were 84 news articles on collusion, excluding overlapping news, quo- 
tations from government reports. Among these articles, 44 were from 2000 to 
2007, with 44% reporting on Gangnam and 56% reporting on Gangbuk. Before 
the rate between the two provinces were 76% and 24%, respectively.
8 A total of 830 people participated in this questionnaire (“How much does the 
public announcement of investigation influence on the collusion and apartment 
price by Bu-dong-san 114) on July 21, 2006. The responses to this question are 
as follows: “No effect on the price stability and collusion” 37%, “Decrease the 
collusion itself, but no effect on the price stability” 20%, “Increase the price be- 
cause of the reduction of trades” 16%. A total of 73% had negative impressions 
of price stability and only 27% answered “price stability and less collusion.”
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concept. If all the buyers are in the ring, the seller's offer price will be- 
come the reserve price. Therefore, the ring accepts or rejects the reserve 
offer and the auction can reduce to a repeated bilateral bargaining 
(Phillips and Menkhaus 2009).9
Overall, this paper contributes to the collusion literature with a uni- 
que setting of a special interest group (ARH), which affects the price 
through collusion based on the bidding ring framework. The remainder 
of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing 
literature. Section III explains the unique characteristics of the Korean 
apartment market compared to that of the U.S., and describe the data. 
Sections IV and V discuss the model on the collusion in the apartment 
market and show empirical results, respectively. Section VI concludes.
II. Literature Review 
Three branches of literature are relevant to this paper. Previous work 
on determinants of the housing price, characteristics of collusion and 
usage of internet news data have contributed to the formulation of the 
research agenda formulated in this paper. 
Studies on determinants of housing price use the Hedonic Model, which 
are heavily influenced by works of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) 
help contextualize the explanation of apartment price fluctuations. Based 
on the model, Huh and Guak (1994) did an empirical research in Korea 
and argued that apartment size, the number of bathrooms, education 
quality and traffic convenience are positively related to prices while pol- 
lution is negatively related. There are some studies on how new towns 
(newly built residential districts) affect the local apartment prices (Ahn 
and Huh 2008; Gu et al. 2009). These papers, in general, insist that 
apartment prices increased after the announcement of new towns. In 
addition, Seo (2008) and Choi (2010) explore the effects of government 
policy on apartment prices using a VAR model. Overall, these papers 
9 Residential collusion may be viewed using the bilateral agency model frame- 
work. In this setting, the principal is the ARH and the agent is the real estate 
agency. ARH has influence over the real estate agents and can observe infor- 
mation about apartments. However, it is different from a traditional bilateral 
agency model for the following four reasons. First, the principals are regarded as 
the one entity, not just because of non-conflicting objectives, but because of 
collusion. Second, ARH is not a business. Third, principal has the right to reject 
the suggestion of agents (veto-based delegation). Finally, principal has the firm 
beliefs that price will rise.
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contribute to finding important variables that affect apartment prices.
The second branch of literature relevant to this study is collusion. 
Theoretical papers for bidding rings ― including Graham and Marshall 
(1987) ― deal with a variety of topics such as static collusion in dif- 
ferent settings like first price auction, second price auction, and dynamic 
collusion. Empirical papers on bidding rings examine diverse topics like 
highway paving (Porter and Zona 1993) school milk (Porter and Zona 
1999), and wholesale stamp dealers (Asker, 2010). With a closer focus 
on firms, Besanko and Spulber (1989, 1990) theoretically explain the 
collusion with the assumption that consumers or anti-trust entities par- 
tially trust information regarding the creation of a cartel. With an addi- 
tional assumption, Harrington and Chen (2004) show that the price is 
less modified under collusion than it is under competition because any 
change in variable cost will only partially be reflected during collusion 
period. Abrantes-Mets et al. (2006) empirically introduce the case of a 
seafood delivery company. Their results reveal a decrease in the average 
price (16%) and an increase in the standard deviation (263%). Coeffi- 
cient variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the average price) 
during the price-fixing period was 332% lower than the price during 
non-collusion period.
The third branch of literature discusses the method of using Internet 
sources as data. Gathering data from the online based sources is grow- 
ing more common in a wide variety of studies, including works related 
to unemployment rate (Ettredge et al. 2005), unemployment payments 
(Baker and Fradkin, 2011), and inflation (Guzman 2011). Among search 
tools using internet sources, Google search engine is a popular one (Choi 
and Varian 2010’ Kahn and Kotchen 2010; Egan et al. 2010). Choi and 
Varian (2010) shows that the use of query indices such as free shipping 
in Google searches is often correlated with various economic indicators 
and may be helpful for short-term economic prediction. Kahn and Kotchen 
(2010) also uses Google search to represent environmental concerns and 
proves that environmental concerns move contrary to business cycles, 
which are measured using unemployment rates. Egan et al. (2010) 
explores how second-order beliefs work to create a return expectation 
and a risk-bearing behavior. In this paper, the number of articles ― 
including apartment market collusion cited on internet news portals ― 
is used to estimate the timing and the duration of collusion activities. 
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III. Background and data
A. Unique characteristics in Korea
The two most distinctive characteristics of the Korean residential mar- 
ket are the concept of apartments and the special interest group, ARH. 
First, in Korea, the perception of apartment ownership differs substan- 
tially from the U.S. Apartment in Korea is similar to a condominium or 
a villa in the U.S. residential market. In the U.S., one individual or com- 
pany generally owns an entire apartment complex and leases apartment 
units through an agent or an office that specializes in leasing. However, 
in Korea, an individual (or a family) owns a single apartment unit like 
condominium in U.S.
Another major difference in the housing market is the strong pre- 
sence of ARH. The ARH is a cohesive neighborhood association mainly 
comprised of housewives. Each ARH represents one apartment complex. 
Although it is not a legal or corporate entity, it has been delegated 
certain rights from the Committee of the Repesentative Residents (CRR) 
of each apartment complex, which is the only official entity based on 
the law on the management of the residential apartments. The ARH 
often helps the CRR to support works that the CRR cannot accomplish 
including neighborhood initiatives, recycling, and decorating the apart- 
ment complex. The influence of ARH on civic centers and even city 
halls is common knowledge in Korea. It has been documented that ARH 
had a role in the collusion of apartment markets in the Gangnam dis- 
trict during the 1980s.10 Furthermore, there have been anecdotes in 
which ARH forced real estate agents to cooperate with the collusion by 
threatening not to do any real estate business with them.11 Hence, it is 
likely that ARH exerted certain influence on the price rise from 2006 to 
2007. This prediction is in line with the government’s swift action in 
middle of 2006, where prosecutors started investigating potential apart- 
ment collusions and threatened full prosecution for collusions. 
B. Definition of collusion
Collusion is generally defined as a conduct in which different parties 
10 “Gangnam's new trend in real estate agency and price collusion by ARH,” 
Kyunghyang shinmun, May 13. 1983.
11 “Real Estate Agents can no longer tolerate ARH price collusion and go on a 
strike, closing agencies,” Seoul Economy, June 20, 2006.
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under competition mutually determine the price and quantity of their 
product through invisible cooperation, thereby removing unnecessary com- 
petition. The essential element of collusion is compensation mechanism, 
which helps sustain cooperation for a long term. However, the apartment 
market generally does not provide a direct compensation mechanism.
ARH is a nonprofit organization and does not directly earn any profit. 
But there are three main factors that enable ARH to keep price-fixing. 
First, there is usually no direct cost in participating in price fixing. In 
general collusion setting, a firm that takes part in price-fixing may ex- 
perience a reduction in profits as sales decrease. On the contrary, in 
the Korean apartment setting, each member of the ARH usually has only 
one or two apartment units and there is no direct cost of colluding. 
Second, government cannot penalize ARH albeit their alleged price-fixing 
until 2006. ARH is not a business group and according to the Fair 
Trade Law of Korea, only businesses can be prosecuted for collusion. 
Third, there are no incentives for ARH to deviate from price-fixing. Re- 
sidents had already learned through the past apartment price shocks 
that the price can be manipulated much higher.
Incorporating these features, this paper defines collusion as ARH's 
collective action to influence price and quantity of available apartments 
through tacit or explicit agreements that restrict competition from 2006 
and 2007.12
C. Reasons for collusion
There are three main reasons for collusion. First, the fundamental rea- 
son for collusion is to increase wealth through raising prices. An apart- 
ment is the largest asset of Korean households and its changing price 
has a significant impact on the wealth of the households. Since collu- 
sion is the easiest way to boost wealth in a short period of time, many 
people, including real estate agents, or speculators tried to collude to 
reap profits.
Second, the expectation about rising housing prices may have encour- 
aged collusion. Table 1 shows the result of questionnaires; the majority 
of respondents from varying social statuses and ages expected that apart- 
ment prices would increase from 2006 to 2007. Such belief possibly 
encouraged ARH to unite further and collude as a ring.
12 This definition of price collusion is more n line with the legal definition 
rather than that from economic theory which usually requires profit-pursuing 
subjects and a compensation mechanism.
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TABLE 1
RESULT OF INQUIRY ABOUT EXPECTATION ON THE APARTMENT PRICE
Third, a sense of deprivation may also have encouraged collusion. 
The districts suspected of collusion were less wealthy than other dis- 
tricts were. When ranking the price of apartment by size, or pyung, 
77% of all of the colluding regions were below the median price. Further- 
more, the increased price gap between Gangbuk and Gangnam region 
after 2001 is supported by Figure 1.
Compared to the CPI, price gap is increased more than seven times 
from 2000 to 2006. In addition, Table 2 represents the new apartment 
construction cost showing the increased price gap. We can suspect that 
residents of Gangbuk may have tried to decrease the price gap. Ac- 
cording to interviews, those who have apartments in the districts with 
low rankings regarded their apartments similar to apartments in the 
districts with high rankings. Hence, the apartment collusion may be 
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Source: Seoul survey 2008.
FIGURE 1 
TREND AND DIFFERENCE IN SALE PRICES IN GANG-NAM AND GANG-BUK




544.04 622.26 686.81 764.18 1052.03 1041.48
18~25.7
Pyung




721.31 837.09 1083.56 1359.63 1504.08 1250.66
Average 611.95 693.36 832.82 1030.46 1254.45 1111.75 1477 1630 1808
Source: Seoul survey 2008.
TABLE 2
NEW APARTMENT CONSTRUCTION COST
driven by the desire to increase wealth, expected higher prices and the 
desire for the less wealthy district to decrease the price gap.
D. Data description
All panel data on the specific characteristics of apartments are taken 
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from Real Estate Bank. Asking prices are used instead of sales price 
from the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) due 
to data errors and short time span. The asking prices are the average 
prices for each floor in each building by month. The average price was 
used because the asking prices itself was not available at the time of 
the study.13
This paper uses two particular periods. From July 1996 to March 1998 
represents standard period, meaning no collusion. From April 2006 to 
December 2007 exemplifies collusion period. The collusion period differs 
for each apartment complexes. Moreover, the sizes of any apartments 
subject to collusion that are not available through the media or Internet 
resources are assumed to be 30 pyung (about 99 m
2), which is the aver- 
age size of the apartments with available data. To set the instance and 
period of collusion, a number of citations from various articles are used. 
The main source of the online news is Naver.com, Korea's most-used 
search engine, which divides the information into eight categories and 
provides searches using parameters such as the amount of content and 
the date of publication as well as other advanced search functions. Other 
search engines including Daum, Google, Yahoo, or Nate do not offer 
detailed parameter specifications. Data for macro-variables are retrieved 
from Economics Statistics System (ECOS).
IV. Model
The collusion effect in the apartment market is measured by using a 
'Difference in Difference (DID)' model. The DID model is widely accepted 
for determining the effect of a program by controlling other external 
economic variables. In this paper, the program is collusion. The partici- 
pants of the program are the colluding districts and the nonparticipants 
are non-colluding districts. The equation for this effect is as follows:
         yis＝a＋bDis＋cDi＋dDs＋ε is                                (1)
         ys＝e＋fM2s＋gCDRs＋hSTOCKs＋iAVGPs＋εs
Here is an issue why additional variables specified on ‘i’ and ‘s’ to 
13 One referee commented that it would be better to replace the price level 
with the rate of the price change. However, the price used in this paper is the 
average price for each apartment, so the price level does not change frequently. 
This leads to an econometric problem in this short period analysis.
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control other effects on the price are not considered. The main reason 
is that it is difficult to find such variables in housing market. Indepen- 
dent variables in a usual setting should be time-varying variables in each 
apartment. However, most of the important variables are time-invariant 
variables and in reverse, all macro variables are place-invariant. Because 
of such reason, this paper sets the two equations separately to take 
into account of other effects that may reduce the overestimated effect of 
collusion.
yis represents the asking price of an apartment in district `i' at time 
`s', and `D' represents the dummy variable for the colluding market and 
time. `i＝1' represents a colluding market, and ‘s＝1’ represents the time 
at which the collusion occurs. Therefore, the market and the period 
under collusion are represented by Di＝1 and Ds＝1, respectively. That 
is, Dis＝1; otherwise, Dis＝0. 
In addition, M2, the cd rate (CDR), Korea's composite stock index 
(STOCK) and the average apartment price (AVGP) in Gangnam and 
Gangbuk are all used for the colluding apartments to control for macro- 
environment. Macro level variables are not included in the DID because 
macro-level data for districts cannot exist. To make up for this weak- 
ness, a level regression is run including macroeconomic variables to get 
an approximate effect of the macroeconomics. For the DID specification, 
the following apartment characteristic variables are matched: size (pyung 
(3.3 m
2)), apartment construction company, the date that residents 
moved into the apartment and other and physical factors. The more 
specific matching process is discussed in the next section. 
The model coefficients are interpreted as follows. Coefficient ‘a’ rep- 
resents the average apartment price in the typical market during a typ- 
ical period. Coefficient ‘c’ also shows the price difference between the 
colluding market and the typical market during normal periods. Coef- 
ficient ‘d' is the price difference between the colluding period and the 
non-colluding period in the typical market. Finally, the most important 
key factor, ‘b’, can be interpreted as the effect of price-fixing. Coefficient 
‘b’ can be obtained by subtracting the difference between the two periods 
in the typical market ‘d’ from the difference between the periods in the 
colluding market ‘b＋d’ or by subtracting the difference in the market 
during typical periods and ‘c’ from the difference in the market during 
the colluding period ‘b＋c’
Regarding the unit root, differentiation of two dates (t, t－1) is not 
used for the following two reasons. First, if a structural break is not 
recognized, though it really is, the test will indicate a unit root where 
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there is none. In other words, with a structural change, all unit root 
tests are biased towards the non-rejection of a unit root (Perron 1989). 
Furthermore, it is often argued that unit root tests are relatively weak 
when used with short time spans of data; therefore, the failure to reject 
the unit root null should be interpreted with caution. In this paper, 
despite the monthly data, co-integration is not used because the pro- 
perties of most data are connected to the weaknesses of the unit root 
test; the duration for which the data are available is short, approximately 
one year, and the primary analytical process is the comparison of two 
separate periods.
A. Selecting the usual market
The apartment unit matching process consists of three steps and 
carefully proceeds in a rigorous way. First, the most similar district is 
matched by five criteria.14 Second, after selecting the most similar dis- 
trict, other factors including district renovation plans controlled by the 
new town plan map.15 Third, apartment characteristics are matched by 
size, apartment construction company, date that residents moved into 
an apartment. The model assumes that the factors that affect the price 
difference between two districts will have the same effect. This assump- 
tion is reasonable from the perspective of selecting the most similar 
districts through a correlation analysis.
In principle, the matching among districts is satisfied when the cor- 
relation value is the highest or, specifically, when the value is over 99% 
among all of the candidate districts. Due to their shared unique qualities, 
some districts are compared to similar districts. Moreover, when identi- 
fying typical apartments, there are two rules to consider. First, if a col- 
luding apartment is in a Dong(the smallest level of administrative divi- 
sion) and experiences a town-wide event, the matched districts must 
also experience a similar effect. Second, the matched district should have 
very similar environments (especially, subway) compared to the collud- 
14 The criteria are as follows: education (entrance rate of all types of high 
school except for special types, to Seoul national university, Yeon-sei and Korea 
University in 2009), income (sale price per the area in pyung in 2006), popu- 
lation (the number of inhabitants per 100 m
2
 in 2006), traffic (the index of ge- 
neral traffic safety in 2006), and the environment (the number of facilities that 
release pollutants in 2005).





ments of a new town are regarded as having identical effects for each of the two 
event periods.
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ing Dong.
B. Selecting the collusion period and time
One of the major challenges in collusion research is identifying the 
exact beginning and length of collusion. In this paper, a number of 
internet articles related to the housing collusion and the beginning of 
the collusion stated by the government are used to identify the best 
estimate for the inception of housing collusion. Although internet articles 
from prominent media are informative and credible, it is possible that 
collusion has not been revealed. In addition, media may be biased. There- 
fore, for the identification of the beginning and the length of the collu- 
sion, this paper also considers general collusion cases in the industries.
According to FTC (Fair Trade Commission), the length of collusion 
among companies varies from 14 years to 9 months. The targets of col- 
lusion are diverse, from food items such as sugar, milk, and chicken, to 
LPG, oil and even interest rates. None of the above targets of collusion 
are similar to apartments which are fairly expensive and has high sub- 
stitution rate among residential apartments. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to refer to these types of examples together rather than comparing the 
apartment prices to only one type of apartment.
Furthermore, we consider the government investigation. During the 
period of June 2006 and January 2007, there were five cases in which 
the same apartments were exposed twice.16 Hence, from this govern- 
mental investigation, it is reasonable to infer that price collusion con- 
tinued even after the time when the government identified the colluded 
cases. We cannot be sure that there were no collusions in other periods. 
However, considering that we rarely find the news on the collusion and 
that we know it is hard to collude during recess time periods (Borenstein 
and Shepard 1996), it is reasonable to regard from 1996.7 to 1998.3 as 
a standard period17 and from 2006.4 to 2007.12 as a collusion period.
In this paper, for the apartments that were uncovered by the first 




) / Dong-bu Centrevil, 




) / Brown-stone Tae-reung, muk Dong, 
Jungnang Gu (2nd, 3rd) / Hyun-dae, Lee-mun Dong, Dongdaemun Gu (4, 5th).
17 This period shows that the most similar trend on GDP with collusion 
period. The contraction phase began in the standard period until August 1998 
which was the lowest point publicly announced. Also, this was before the phrase 
'invincibility myth in Gangnam (newly coined term indicates a phenomenon that 
an investment in apartments or land in Gangnam never fails) began spreading. 
Refer to Appendix for more explanation on collusion period and market.
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investigation, the collusion is assumed to have occurred in May 2006, 
two months before July 2006, when the investigation started. This as- 
sumption follows from available news shown in Figure 2 which shows 
that the interest about collusion drastically increased since May 2006. 
Another reason for this assumption is that most apartments selected 
here for analysis joined in the collusion relatively late, which is based 
on the observation. The collusion period is set at fourteen months under 
the assumption that the apartments that were exposed twice may have 
started colluding on price two months before they were exposed. In ad- 
dition, it is considered that it took six months before these apartments 
were exposed again. However, this treatment will only be applied to the 
apartments that were exposed by the first investigation. For the second 
case, the term during which there is collusion will be one year from the 
moment when the price-fixing is revealed. The reason for the reduction 
of two months comes from the assumption that ARH behaved rationally. 
That is, it is unreasonable to think that ARH would be likely to shift 
from an internal to an external approach to collusion while investigations 
are being conducted.18
As a result of the matching using these suppositions, seven apart- 
ments are chosen. Several candidate apartments are removed because 
their data are too limited to be used; specifically, the apartments for 
which there are no data from July 1996 to March 1998 are not con- 
sidered.
V. Results
Table 3 shows the effect of collusion is relatively strong except for 
one apartment.19 The variation in the coefficients of the macro variables 
is measured as the percentage variation when an independent variable 
increases by 1% as all the variables are log except for the dummy 
variables and the CD rate. Before showing the results, it is necessary to 
understand that district time trend is not reflected in the estimation 
18 The number of samples is also considered for setting one year as a col- 
lusion period.
19① Seo-gwang apartment, Wol-gye Dong, Nowon district, ② Shin-dong-ah 
apartment, Yong-du Dong, Dongdaemun district, ③ Hyun-dae apartment, Jang- 
an Dong, Dongdaemun district, ④ Jung-ang Heights apartment, Seok-gwan 
Dong, Seongbuk district, ⑤ Han-sin apartment, Dok-san Dong, Geumcheon 
district, ⑥ Yoo-won apartment, Mun-rae Dong, Youngdeungpo district, ⑦ Han- 
jeon Hyun-dae apartment, Dang-san Dong, Youngdeungpo district








































































because of a lack of data. Therefore, the effect of collusion maybe over- 
estimated.
The apartment prices used in this paper were generally priced at from 
KRW 2 to 3 billion during the period of from 2006 to 2007, and among 
all case studies, the price of each apartment affected by collusion in- 
creased from KRW 7.2 million to 40.3 million.20 Based on this result, 
the price-fixing in apartments significantly increased the price of the 
colluding apartments between 2006~2007. Comparing this value to real 
figures, proportions (the price variation rate by DID model over the aver- 
age increase rate of apartment sales index in identical period a year ago) 
are 11%, 249%, 131%, 212%, 18%, 77%, and 33% (one invalid value is 
not shown). From these figures, we learn that collusion is partially 
20 Using the sale price, the calculated effect of collusion is approximately from 
KRW 67 to 390 million, depending on which price we use, and varies from KRW 
1.1 to 26.3 million.
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responsible for the dramatic increase. With regard to Dongdaemun, the 
level of price fluctuation differs from one apartment to another and one 
district to another. One interesting point is that the rate of the price 
increase of two apartments (②, ③) through collusion in Dongdaemun is 
much greater than the average rate of increase in the same district. 
However, the collusion effects are dependent on the Dong in the 
Youngdeungpo district (⑥, ⑦). For the Nowon district (①), the rate of 
increase under collusion is relatively low.21 These differences may be 
due to incompletely controlled variables, such as the uniqueness of 
apartments or positive regional events; however, the difference might 
come from the different level of efficiency in each collusion case.
It is interesting that some elements of the collusion effect are proved 
because price-fixing cannot be sustained when we consider economic 
theory. In this example of collusion, the subject is a non-business party, 
ARH, which is a type of social gathering and whose members are mainly 
housewives. These members inherently respond to costs and benefits, 
but the educational environment of their children, their husbands' jobs 
and liquidity shocks are more important factors that may lead them to 
buy or sell their houses. In addition, the resistance of real estate agencies 
and government investigations may disturb collusion. However, the result 
of DID supports this paper’s assumption that the role of collusion by 
ARH is highly influential in causing dramatically increased price of apart- 
ments. We can reasonably believe that collusion was well established 
for at least one year. Consequently, high price increase in 2006 and 
2007 has not been just caused by the lack of supply but also collusion.
Table 4 also shows the effect of other variables, in particular, the macro 
finance variables. However, only one or two macro variables affect the 
apartment price in each district, indicating that macro variables may 
not be so influential in the period of collusion. Furthermore, the trend 
effect in Gangnam and Gangbuk only affect apartment price rather 
than macroeconomic variables in three district. Interestingly, the trend 
21 The variation in variables are similar if we narrow the period under col- 
lusion by two to four months or extend it by one to ten months on the basis of 
the number of accusatory articles. For the first case, the collusion effect de- 
creases in No-won and Dongdaemun and increases in Geumcheon and Young- 
deungpo by less than 1%. Other variables move against the collusion effect and 
vary at rates below 2%. In the second case, the variables change at most by 4%, 
and the effects in all districts except for Youngdeungpo are more pronounced. 
Furthermore, as the period under study increases, the some variables that were 
previously statistically insignificant become significant. This shift may have 
resulted from the uncontrolled effects of positive events.
                  APARTMENT PRICE COLLUSION 353
effect varies even in the same district, Youngdeungpo district, but not 
in the Dongdaemun district. Such variation may be due to some omitted 
variables not captured by the model. In addition, the weak relation bet- 
ween apartment price and macro variables may suggest that apartment 
prices are abnormal as it does not reflect the macroeconomic condi- 
tions. Considering that the coefficient of trend is large and statistically 
significant in Seongbuk, Geumcheon and Youngdeungpo districts, the 
effect of collusion may be overestimated due to the omission of the 
district time trend in the model.
VI. Concluding Remarks
It is difficult to isolate the effects of pure collusion on apartment 
prices in Korea. Unlike other products, apartment prices are affected by 
many more factors including education, living conditions and social 
status. Furthermore, it is difficult to expose collusion by ARH because 
collusion itself is secret and there are no measure to reveal collusion 
except for price (in case of a firm, for example, varying cost also can be 
a good clue to disclose the collusion). Moreover, government does not 
have incentives to investigate collusion by ARH since ARH is a non- 
profit organization. In this sense, this paper is a pioneering effort to 
measure the effect of collusion in the apartment market in Korea. This 
paper shows that price-fixing by ARH did increase apartment price by 
approximately from KRW 7.2 to 40.3 million from 2006 to 2007. How- 
ever, this collusion effect may be overestimated due to the omitted trend 
effect. 
For future research, researchers can explore other additional data to 
verify the collusion periods, and help identify the duration of collusion 
periods. Although it may be challenging, researchers can collect apart- 
ment bid prices through real estate agencies. Also, different matching 
methods, for instance propensity score matching, can be applied. Ap- 
plying various matching methods may generate a larger pool of matching 
results. Furthermore, researchers may consider other apartment char- 
acteristics such as proximity to the Han river, traffic convenience to 
further improve the matching. Finally, the potential ripple effect of dis- 
trict apartment prices on other districts can also be studied. Although 
some (Seo 2007) find that ripple effect may be negligible, with further 
studies, it may be found otherwise.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1
INDEX OF APARTMENT SALE PRICES IN GANG-BUK, GANG-NAM, 
SIX METROPOLITAN CITIES, AND GYUNG-GI PROVINCE
Appendix 122
Administration System in Seoul
There are seven major big cities (Seoul, Busan, Incheon, Daegu, 
Daejeon, Gwangju, Ulsan) and nine provinces (Gyeonggi-do, Gangwon-do, 
Chungcheongbuk-do, Chungcheongnam-do, Gyeongsangbuk-do, 
Gyeongsangnam-do, Jeollabuk-do, Jeollanam-do, Jeju-do) in Korea. Seoul 
and Gyeong-gi province have the highest population in each category. 
This paper concentrates on 25 districts in Seoul (Appendix Figure 3). 
Each district has different size and population. Each district also con- 
sists of few ‘dongs’ which are smaller administrative unit in each district. 
In addition, there are two smaller unit of administration in Seoul, which 
are ‘tong’ and ‘ban.’ In summary, Seoul consists of 25 districts, 522 
dongs, 13,787 tong and 102,796 ban. In this paper, ‘dong’ is the smallest 
unit of administration.
Korean unofficially categorize Seoul into two parts: Gangnam (11 
districts: Dongjak, Gangnam, Gangseo, Gangdong, Geumcheon, Guro, 
Gwanak, Mapo, Seocho, Seongdong, Songpa, Yangcheon, Yeongdeungpo) 
and Gangbuk (14 districts: Dobong, Dongdaemun, Eunpyeong, Gangbuk, 
Gwangjin, Jongno, Jung, Jungnang, Mapo, Nowon, Seodaemun, Seongdong, 
Seongbuk, Yongsan) using Han-river. Gangnam indicates all districts 
below the Han river in Seoul and Gangbuk also indicates all districts 
22 https://en.wikipedia.org
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APPENDIX FIGURE 2
THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES FOUND BY THE TERM “PRICE-FIXING FOR AN 
APARTMENT” IN 2006~2007 AND 2000~2005
Source: Wikipedia (Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org)
APPENDIX FIGURE 3
ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM IN SEOUL
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APPENDIX FIGURE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “POWER OF SELLING-BUYING” AND 
“FLUCTUATION RATE OF SALE INDEX” IN GANG-NAM
above the Han river. “Gangnam district” (Gangbuk district) is just one 
district in Gangnam (Gangbuk).
Appendix 2
The reason for choosing Gangbuk before 2000
By examining Appendix Figure 4, Appendix Figure 5 and Appendix 
Figure 6, Gangnam dominates Gangbuk in terms of the apartment sales 
index in 2003 and the rate of variation during 1999~2000. Gangnam’s 
dominance signifies that before that period, the price difference between 
Gangnam and Gangbuk was generally small and that the price in 
Gangbuk was even greater than the price in Gangnam. Therefore, there 
could be less motivation for the people in Gangbuk to collude before 
2000.
From Appendix Figure 4 and Appendix Figure 5, in Gangnam before 
2007, the “difference between the power of selling and buying” and “the 
fluctuation rate of the sales index” measured for the same period of the 
previous year exhibited opposite directions; such relationship disappeared 
in Gangnam after 2007. In the case of Gangbuk, the relationship bet- 
ween the same indices is opposite to the relationship found in Gangnam. 
A positive relationship in the “difference between powers of selling and 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 6
THE RATE OF APARTMENT SALES PRICE INDEX VARIANCE IN THE SAME 
PERIOD LAST YEAR IN GANG-BUK AND GANG-NAM
Source: Kookmin bank (Available at: www.nland.kbstar.com)
APPENDIX FIGURE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “POWER OF SELLING-BUYING” AND
“FLUCTUATION RATE OF SALE INDEX'” IN GANG-BUK
buying” indicates that the sellers have significant power and vice versa. 
Appendix Figure 4 and Appendix Figure 5 show an increase in average 
apartment price when the sellers' power is weak (buyers' power is 
strong). In general, considering that agents of collusion used to reduce 
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the quantity of products sold in the market, applying this notion to the 
last interpretation, collusion might have been strong before 2007 and 
absent in Gangnam after 2007. However, in Gangbuk, the relationship 
between the “power of selling-buying” and “the fluctuation rate of the 
sales index” commences in 2007.
Because only a few data points on the sellers' and buyers' power 
before July 2003, it is difficult to find evidence of this relationship 
before 2003. However, the three figures above are consistent with the 
finding that the accusatory news stories significantly decrease in Gang- 
nam. Therefore, if the levels of the sellers' and buyers' power behave 
similarly prior to 2003, it can at least be said that collusion was not 
popular during that period, even if we cannot be sure that collusion 
was nonexistent in Gangbuk. Therefore, there are no problems with 
treating Gangbuk as a typical region prior to 2003.
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